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RESPONSE†
ANIMUS THICK AND THIN: THE BROADER
IMPACT OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION
IN PERRY V. BROWN
Nan D. Hunter*
There is a concern among supporters of marriage equality, especially those
in the legal academy, that the decision of the Ninth Circuit in Perry v. Brown1
was too good to be true or, perhaps, too clever to be sustainable.2 Judges Reinhardt and Hawkins crafted a decision that struck down Proposition 83 with reasoning that applies only to California. All but ignoring Judge Walker’s farreaching trial court opinion in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, they grounded their
analysis in an application of heightened rational basis scrutiny, derived from
Romer v. Evans,4 that emphasized the significance of taking away an important
right from an unpopular minority.
The only problem with this analysis for marriage equality supporters is
that, despite the principle that courts should resolve constitutional disputes on
the narrowest possible grounds, the “taking away” portion of the rationale
† Responding to William N. Eskridge Jr., The Ninth Circuit’s Perry Decision and the
Constitutional Politics of Marriage Equality, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 93 (2012).
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Graduate Programs, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012).
2. See, e.g., David Cole, Gambling with Gay Marriage, N.Y. REV. BOOKS NYRBLOG
(Feb. 9, 2012, 11:48 AM), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/feb/09/gambling
-gay-marriage/ (arguing that Perry is unlikely to evade review); Jason Mazzone, Marriage
and the Ninth Circuit: Thumbs Down, BALKINIZATION (Feb. 7, 2012, 7:18 PM), http://balkin
.blogspot.com/2012/02/marriage-and-ninth-circuit-thumbs-down.html (arguing that Perry is
“dishonest and foolish”).
3. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, held unconstitutional by Perry v. Brown, 2012 WL
372713, at *29, aff’g Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
4. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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strikes some as too outcome driven and transparently invented for the goal of
providing the Supreme Court with a plausible rationale for denying certiorari.5
From this view, the opinion’s political strength will also be its greatest doctrinal weakness.
I disagree on two counts. First, I read the opinion as being far more nuanced than it has been given credit for, and believe that its elaboration of the
role of animus in judicial review is an important contribution to equal protection doctrine. Second, critics are missing a deeper point: the greatest political
strength of the Perry opinion lies not in the short-term question of whether the
Supreme Court will accept review, but in its contribution to the more enduring
issue of how courts can balance their role of serving as an antimajoritarian
check on populist retaliation against minorities while also preserving the values
of popular constitutionalism.
A.

Refining the Role of Animus in Equal Protection Analysis

The fundamental point of the “taking away” aspect of the Perry decision
is that singling out a socially disfavored group for the withdrawal of an important right reeks of animus. This should not be a controversial claim. Considered
together with the denigration of gay people that saturated the pro-Proposition 8
campaign, the consequence of the “taking away” sequence of events is to trigger heightened rational basis, the standard of review used by the Supreme
Court in Romer v. Evans.6 In my view, sexual orientation ought to be considered fully suspect when it is used as a basis for differential treatment under law,
but neither the Supreme Court nor any U.S. court of appeals has so held.
By contrast, taking a closer look at laws infused with animus is something
that the Supreme Court has done since 1973, when it struck down a law enacted
to disqualify otherwise eligible “hippies” from obtaining food stamps.7 However, the Supreme Court has done so rarely and, more importantly, has
never said that it was using this device. Indeed, how to categorize and assess
animus has become a recurring and unresolved question in equal protection
law.
Justice Scalia raised the stakes on animus in his dissent in Romer, in which
he attacked the majority opinion for adopting “the proposition that opposition
to homosexuality is as reprehensible as racial or religious bias.”8 Scalia derided
the Court’s suggestion that voters had “been guilty of ‘animus’ or ‘animosity’
toward homosexuality,”9 and characterized its “stern disapproval of ‘animosity’
5. See sources cited supra note 2.
6. See, e.g., Ellen E. Halfon, A Changing Equal Protection Standard? The Supreme

Court’s Application of a Heightened Rational Basis Test in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 921, 959 (1987).
7. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534, 538 (1973).
8. 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 644 (quoting id. at 632, 634 (majority opinion)).
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toward homosexuality” as a misreading of a “reasonable effort to preserve traditional American moral values.”10
In Board of Trustees v. Garrett, a case that divided the Court five to four,
the dissenting opinion argued that adverse treatment resting upon “negative attitudes, fear, or irrational prejudice” necessarily violated the Equal Protection
Clause.11 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, replied that
“[a]lthough such biases may often accompany irrational . . . discrimination,
their presence alone does not a constitutional violation make.”12 Justices Kennedy and O’Connor both joined the Rehnquist opinion, but also wrote separately to say that “[p]rejudice . . . rises not from malice or hostile animus
alone,” but also from thoughtlessness.13 Clearly the concept of animus marked
highly contested ground.
Justice O’Connor responded in her concurring opinion in Lawrence v.
Texas, where she spelled out the analysis for why evidence of animus (presumably when not merely “prejudice”) should trigger tougher review under the
Equal Protection Clause, even for nonsuspect classifications.14 Perry, however,
is the first opinion with precedential weight to adopt Justice O’Connor's approach.
When, in the next step of its logic, the Ninth Circuit applies heightened rational basis review to Proposition 8, it accepts the proposition that there might
be a rational reason—i.e., apart from animus—for a state to limit the benefits
linked to marriage to only those couples who might “procreate accidentally.”15
Since same-sex couples don’t have those kinds of accidents, including them in
the group eligible to marry would not be necessary to advance that interest.
Thus, the court reasons, a state could rationally choose to exclude gay couples
from marriage.
In the California context, however, the proponents of Proposition 8 advanced no legitimate reason for taking away the right to marry and its presumed protective benefits for children from the broader group covered under a
regime of marriage equality. Again, according to the Ninth Circuit,
there could be a legitimate purpose in such a retrenchment; one could imagine
that curbing state expenses could be a rational motivation (assuming that the
absence of same-sex marriage would save state funds, which economists have
found to be a false assumption16).

10. Id. at 651 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 634 (majority opinion)).
11. 531 U.S. 356, 381 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (internal quota-

tion marks omitted).
12. Id. at 367 (majority opinion).
13. Id. at 374 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
14. See 539 U.S. 558, 579-85 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
15. Perry v. Brown, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713, at *20-21 (9th Cir.
Feb. 7, 2012).
16. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 941-42 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d,
2012 WL 372713.
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The difficulty with this part of the court’s reasoning is that the accidental
procreation argument itself is so strained. Using marriage as a state-sanctioned
mechanism for enhancing the likelihood that adults who have children will legally bind themselves to each other and thereby—so the theory goes—provide
a stable family dynamic for raising children is advanced as much by allowing
gay couples to marry as allowing straight couples to marry, since as many as 31
per cent of lesbian couples and 8 per cent of gay male couples are raising children.17 So for the court to accept that accidental procreation is a plausible state
interest, it has to accept that the state could have a legitimate interest in protecting only the children of unplanned and unwanted pregnancies. With animus
having triggered a heightened rational basis test, critics see the court’s crediting
this argument as a weakness in its reasoning.
However, if standard jurisprudential principles are applied fairly, the court
should be allowed to postpone this issue for another day. One value of encouraging courts to decide cases on the narrowest possible ground is that it allows
the allocation of rights and powers among competing social factions to evolve
gradually. The Perry court did not have to reach the question of whether the
accidental procreation rationale could ever make sense, so it didn’t. Beneath
this hesitancy surely lay an understanding that profound shifts in social meaning occur in slow motion; that very factor justifies minimalist adjudication.
The bigger problem in sustaining the Reinhardt-Hawkins opinion on appeal
comes from an entirely different factor. The strongest reason for the Supreme
Court to grant certiorari is its tendency to review decisions that invalidate state
laws on federal law grounds. Thus, while I think the Perry panel opinion creates the strongest basis for the Supreme Court to deny certiorari, I would give
that result only equal odds. Ultimately, the Court’s decision on certiorari may
well turn on how Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy resolve the tension
between the federalism concerns that arise from striking down state laws and
the Court’s prudence in avoiding unnecessary ventures into the heart of culture
wars. That will, I believe, be a very tough choice.
B. Animus and Elections
Even if this opinion turns out not to mark the end of the Proposition 8
drama, I think that it makes a different and arguably more far-reaching contribution to understanding the role of a countermajoritarian judiciary in modern
governance.
Voter initiatives such as Proposition 8 are particularly likely to be infected
with the intent to scapegoat and retaliate against minority groups. In Strauss v.
17. Christopher Carpenter & Gary J. Gates, Gay and Lesbian Partnership: Evidence
from California, 45 DEMOGRAPHY 573, 582 tbl.2 (2008). See also Gary J. Gates, Family
Formation and Raising Children Among Same-Sex Couples, FAMILY FOCUS ON LGBT
FAMILIES F1 (Winter 2011), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/
uploads/Gates-Badgett-NCFR-LGBT-Families-December-2011.pdf.
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Horton,18 LGBT rights groups brought the first challenge to Proposition 8 in
state court, on state constitutional grounds, using a theory focused on constitutional process rather than substance. They argued unsuccessfully that eliminating the right of same-sex couples to marry constituted a fundamental alteration
of the structure of governance because it so seriously undermined the power of
the judicial branch (the state supreme court) to serve its proper countermajoritarian function as to individual rights. The California Supreme Court ruled that
Proposition 8 amended, but did not fundamentally revise, the state constitution,
and thus was valid.
But the Strauss decision left unresolved a deeper question of whether
popular majorities should be able to strip constitutional protections from minorities. Because the Strauss plaintiffs wanted to insulate their challenge
against Supreme Court review, they did not raise, and the state court thus did
not rule on, the issue of whether Proposition 8 violated the federal Constitution.
Ignoring the pleas of the advocacy organizations, a group of gay and progay individuals then filed the Perry case in federal court, arguing that Proposition 8 violated the liberty and equality rights of same-sex couples under the
U.S. Constitution. This challenge focused on substantive individual-rights
claims, and raised no process issues as to the validity more generally of voter
initiatives that selectively target minority groups. Thus, for strategic reasons,
the various litigants framed their challenges to Proposition 8 as either exclusively about process under the state constitution (Strauss) or exclusively about
substantive liberty under the federal Constitution (Perry).
The Ninth Circuit opinion, albeit indirectly, applies federal constitutional
analysis to the question of whether unchecked majoritarianism as exemplified
by Proposition 8 must be accepted as legitimate in a constitutional democracy.
The decision proffers a limited but nonetheless helpful antidote to the most
egregious kind of populist smackdown of unpopular rights. It creates a barrier
to using elections to eliminate protections that have been adopted through the
mechanisms of deliberative democracy and that seek to rectify a clear historical
pattern of discrimination. Hence, again, we see the relevance of animus.
Under the analysis in Perry, such a vote may or may not be constitutional,
depending on a series of factors. The determination will turn on whether the retraction had a demonstrably legitimate purpose, one other than simply stigma
and status denigration. The evidence relevant to that inquiry would not be a
contest over the moral worth of the social group in question, such as was implicit in the trial record in Perry. Instead, a trial court’s inquiry would be directed toward the framing of the issue, the text of the question put to voters and
of the state’s official explanation, and the primary campaign materials relied on
to persuade voters to adopt it, all factors that Judges Reinhardt and Hawkins
cited extensively in their opinion.

18. 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009).
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What would be the practical and productive result of such an approach to
assessing the constitutionality of voter initiatives? One effect would surely be
that the proponents of this kind of constitutional amendment would curtail the
opprobrium quotient of their proposal and their rhetoric. To withstand a postelection challenge, they will likely try to link more carefully their initiatives to
noninvidious goals.
In that way, adopting the mechanism suggested in Perry would encourage
self-policing of some of the most hateful sorts of anti-civil rights campaigns. It
would not, and consistent with the First Amendment should not, eliminate bigoted arguments in the public sphere. But the knowledge that the judiciary
would serve as a check against the darker impulses of human nature might mitigate the worst of them.
A second indirect effect would be to provide a bit of shelter to state-court
justices who understand that rulings benefiting unpopular minorities will almost certainly elicit backlash. In some jurisdictions, the state constitution requires both legislative and electoral votes before overturning such a decision by
state constitutional amendment,19 and in those states, that process serves the
same kind of deliberation-producing effect that the promise of retroactive review would provide. In other situations, backlash can take the form of targeting
individual judges who face retention elections,20 a device that would be unaffected by the Perry analysis.
Thus, although initially the panel opinion in Perry would affect only Proposition 8, its larger contribution may be the creative way that it addresses the
persistent, intractable conundrum of America’s countermajoritarian difficulty.
The opinion does this in part by taking animus seriously as one of the criteria
for heightened rational basis review and in part by creating a modest curb on
popularly enacted state constitutional amendments. If the Ninth Circuit grants
rehearing en banc, the opinion will be vacated, but one hopes that its contribution to the evolution of equal protection law will endure.

19. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, pt. IV, §§ 4-5 (requiring two successive legislative votes of at least twenty-five percent of members and a popular vote).
20. Three members of the Iowa Supreme Court who joined the opinion striking down
that state’s exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage, Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862
(Iowa 2009), were turned out by voters in the state’s 2010 judicial election. Patrick Caldwell,
Disorder in the Court, AM. PROSPECT, Oct. 2011, at 44, 45, available at http://prospect.org/
article/disorder-court.

